Friday, February 26, 2021
Home World The Role of the Maldives in the Indo-Pacific Security Space in South...

The Role of the Maldives in the Indo-Pacific Security Space in South Asia

The signing of a defence settlement between the Maldives and the United States (US) in September 2020 was welcomed by India as a optimistic step in direction of regional cooperation (Rej, 2020). Historically cautious of extra-regional powers participating in army and strategic actions in its Indian Ocean ‘backyard’, India has claimed a dominant position in phrases of managing regional maritime boundaries. Located ‘barely 70 nautical miles away from Minicoy and 300 nautical miles away from India’s West coast, [and within] the hub of business sea‐lanes working via Indian Ocean (notably the 8° N and 1 ½° N channels),’(Ministry of External Affairs, 2019a, p. 1) the Maldives occupies a crucial strategic place in South Asia. A historical past of pleasant ties and geographic proximity have ensured political belief, financial cooperation and coherent strategic polices between the two. Despite the historic bonds between these neighbours, their relationship took a pointy flip in direction of political uncertainty between 2013 and 2018 because of this of former Maldivian President Abdulla Yameen Abdul Gayoom’s pro-China coverage (Rasheed, 2018, 2019, 2020). Bringing an extra-regional energy like China into the South Asian periphery created vital political anxiousness in India—a stage of concern that was not obvious when the Maldives prolonged security-based cooperation with the US. This prejudice is linked to India’s position in the Indo-Pacific alliance with the US, Australia, and Japan to curb China’s potential strategic rise in the Asia-Pacific. All 4 Indo-Pacific states view China as a possible safety risk in their regional peripheries the place in that India has a better position to curb the rise of extra-territorial powers in South Asia’s maritime boundaries (Baruah, 2020; Laskar, 2020; Ministry of External Affairs, 2018; Rehman, 2009). The Maldives-US defence cooperation is just one half of the broader position India performs in limiting China’s engagement in the area.

This article discusses how India’s central position in South Asia’s modern maritime safety area has been affected by the Maldives’ regional improvement coverage. Contrary to orthodox worldwide relations considering that dominant and bigger states usually decide regional safety dynamics, it argues that India has not all the time managed or been sure about the Maldives’ regional overseas coverage (Flockhart, 2008; Rasheed, 2018, 2019, 2020) and that the drivers of political certainty and strategic coherence in that area are, in truth, usually affected by the political decisions of the Maldives. Former Maldivian president and political strongman Abdulla Yameen Abdul Gayoom began this development in 2013 by adopting pro-China insurance policies and drawing Chinese pursuits into the regional periphery (Rasheed, 2018, 2020). It turned mandatory for India to interact with the Maldives to curb China’s growing affect over maritime boundaries of South Asia. However, India was in a position to affect Maldives-China coverage solely after pro-Western President Mohammed Solih got here to energy in November 2018. Solih’s new authorities reiterated the ‘India First’ coverage and withdrew China as a precedence improvement companion (Rasheed, 2020) which led to enhanced defence and strategic cooperation between India and the Maldives.

This viewpoint aligns with constructivism in worldwide relations the place shared concepts have a capability to form and re-shape inter-state relationships regardless of pre-existing norms and practices (Flockhart, 2016; Wendt, 1992). As constructivists would argue, regardless of the conventional Maldives-India regional partnerships, India’s means to strengthen its nearer ties with the Maldives has been formed by the political decisions and concepts of President Solih’s authorities to reinforce defence and safety cooperation with India as half of its regional overseas coverage agenda (Rasheed, 2018, 2020). In line with this remark, this text goals to grasp the potential alternatives and challenges for India in sustaining its management in the Indo-Pacific safety area with respect to the Maldives. It explores authorities coverage statements and selections to show how political concepts can form the Maldives’ overseas coverage to drive a sustainable Maldives-India defence and safety cooperation that helps India’s regional safety goals.   

Political Ideas as Drivers of Regional Cooperation

During the interval from 2013 to 2018, India skilled a interval of political uncertainty in phrases of the Maldives’ position in shaping regional energy dynamics by adopting a pro-China coverage for improvement cooperation. Former President Yameen’s coverage to convey China nearer to the Maldives was clearly outlined by his method to political and nationwide improvement cooperation (Rasheed, 2020). In his 2017 Independence Day remarks, President Yameen asserted that the Maldives had moved its nationwide efforts past home boundaries in direction of creating alternatives to compete with professionals and consultants of worldwide stature (President’s Office, 2017a; Rasheed, 2018).

Today, the nationwide debate ought to be about whether or not we as a nation, have what it takes to attempt and win the worldwide race. [And that] … in the previous 4 years, now we have undertaken developmental work, unparalleled to every other developmental period, Yameen introduced (President’s Office, 2017a).

As a small island creating state (SIDS) reliant on worldwide and bilateral cooperation for improvement assist, the Maldives was drawn to what China provided below its Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). Also generally known as One Belt, One Road (OBOR) the initiative goals to strengthen Beijing’s financial management in maritime states reminiscent of the Maldives via monetary assist (Das, 2017; Rasheed, 2018, 2020).

The BRI is exclusive in that its host governments have political independence in figuring out the way to obtain and handle the funds and investments (Xinhuanet, 2017; State Council of PRC, 2014; Zhang & Huang; Zhang, Gu, and Chen, 2015). In distinction to Western-based assist businesses, China’s precept of non-interference in the inner affairs of its host nations made its assist situations extra enticing to Yameen’s authorities.  Yameen’s political and financial concepts didn’t align with democratic governance and conventional improvement cooperation practices. His concepts didn’t meet the post-colonial improvement cooperation that imposed situations on home affairs of the state. This is mirrored by Yameen’s assertion that

constitutional frameworks are designed in this fashion to make sure that the pursuits of the state [the Maldivian government] reign supreme. [And that] …the battle, to maintain influential colonial powers at bay, now emerges with gasoline from inside the Maldives (President’s Office, 2017a).

And it will make sense for a authorities that engaged in strongman practices to favour assist that supported its political and financial agenda with none impositions on its political workplace in phrases of extra-territorial insurance policies. Referring to the perform of organisations like the United Nations, Yameen harassed that:

There will probably be no stability if one nation can intervene in one other’s inner affairs and there should not many issues the UN can do when such interferences happen. … I want to spotlight that we are able to solely transfer ahead, and be revered if we’re a self-sufficient, robust economic system which may stand by itself ft. … [And that] we’re looking for simpler methods for us to have entry to assist by bringing in massive investments. (Maldives Independent 2015)

The BRI’s assist mannequin aligned with the political concepts that had formed Yameen’s unbiased coverage on improvement cooperation to assist political stability (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China 2014; President’s Office 2014a; Joshi, 2018).  

Considering President Yameen’s favouritism in direction of China, India raised issues over unfavourable implications of the Maldives-China engagement that might result in growing financial debt traps and strategic build-up that might doubtlessly threaten the safety of the South Asia area. An alleged operation of China’s naval fleet in South Asia’s territorial waters in assist of Yameen’s authorities in 2018 highlighted the geostrategic competitors posed by China’s engagement in the Maldives’ territory (Rasheed, 2018). India may view China’s naval presence close to the Maldives as an try and curb any efforts to intervene in the Yameen authorities’s actions throughout that point. The following assertion was issued by a spokesperson from the Chinese Foreign Ministry in an try and justify the behaviour:

What is going on inside the Maldives is the inner affairs of the nation. [And] the worldwide group shall play a constructive position on the foundation of respecting the sovereignty of the Maldives, as an alternative of additional complicating the state of affairs. (Tiezzi, 2018).

India demanded better transparency from the Maldives on regional safety fronts. Reportedly, this was not well-received by the Yameen’s authorities, which countered with a forceful reply:

[Development cooperation in the Maldives] is an open invitation. …We have taken rather a lot of our initiatives to India as effectively, however we didn’t obtain the mandatory finance. (…) Our authorities has made it very clear that we aren’t going to permit any form of army institutions or army undertakings in the Maldives. Not for China, not for every other nations.’ (South China Morning Post 2018)

Development cooperation between the Maldives and China was understood as mutually helpful and never as a regional technique. 

Despite these engagements with China, the Maldives-China relationship was weakened following President Solih’s election, heralding a renewed coverage shift in direction of enhanced Maldives-India cooperation (Rasheed, 2019). His new authorities sought assist from India and the US instantly after the election ‘to climb out from under a mountain of Chinese debt.’ (Miglani & Mohamed, 2018). The ‘India First’ coverage was moulded by political concepts about strengthening traditionally and geographically pushed neighbourly relations between the two nations to advertise bilateral and regional cooperation. Following a number of state and bilateral visits, political leaders of each the Maldives and India have celebrated renewed measures of improvement cooperation. To reiterate Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s phrases:

I’ll convey to the new Maldivian Government of Mr Solih the need of the Indian Government to work intently for realisation of their developmental priorities, particularly in areas of infrastructure, well being care, connectivity and human useful resource improvement. (The Economic Times, 2020)

President Solih was fast to take his predecessor’s China coverage below overview and alter his overseas coverage to reinforce partnerships with India as his political concepts aligned with the latter’s management position in South Asia. A joint assertion by the two states throughout Prime Minister Modi’s state go to to the Maldives in 2019 introduced that the ‘two leaders reiterated their strong commitment to further strengthening and invigorating the traditionally strong and friendly relations between India and the Maldives’ (Ministry of External Affairs, 2019b). The assertion welcomed India’s assist and budgetary assist of the Maldives to deal with potential debt crises arising from China’s investments undertaken throughout Yameen’s authorities. Under subsequent bilateral agreements, a number of improvement initiatives have been carried out with the assist of India’s US$800 million line of credit score facility assist, together with 1000 schooling scholarships over 5 years from 2018, US$100 million Greater Malé Connectivity Project (Miadhu, 2020), provide of constructing supplies to develop public parks in 67 native islands and construct bridges connecting the capital metropolis Malé and regional and industrial islands. Table 1 summarises the key Indian assist and improvement cooperation programmes in the Maldives as of 2019. Table 1: The key Indian assist and improvement cooperation programmes in the Maldives (Ministry of External Affairs, 2019a).

India’s Strategic Step-up in the Maldives

Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s authorities embraced the Solih authorities’s ‘India First’ coverage as a chance to reinforce regional safety cooperation. During an official go to of External Affairs Minister of India (EAM) Smt. Sushma Swaraj to the Maldives, the Foreign Minister of the Maldives ‘reiterated his Government’s “India-First Policy” and mentioned that his Government seems to be ahead to working intently with the Government of India on all points’ (Ministry of External Affairs, 2019c). Noting renewed dedication to neighbourly relations between the two states, the Maldives Foreign Minister additionally reiterated that the Government of Maldives would stay delicate to India’s safety and strategic issues. In 2019, a technical settlement was signed by the two states on sharing White Shipping info between the Indian Navy and the Maldives National Defence Force (MNDF). This settlement was half of a long-term dedication made by Prime Minister Modi throughout his state go to to the Maldives in June 2019 (Ministry of External Affairs, 2019b). Training actions (together with Ekatha, performed in April 2019) have been carried out to construct capability in the MNDF. According to India’s Ministry of External Affairs (2019a):  

India has skilled over 1250 MNDF trainees over the previous 10 years and have provided 175 coaching vacancies in 2019‐20. MNDF has additionally been collaborating in varied mil‐to‐mil actions reminiscent of sea‐rider programme, journey camps, crusing regatta and many others. [India has] … additionally provided to depute Mobile Training Teams (MTT) primarily based on MNDF necessities and to coach MNDF personnel for UN peace‐retaining operations at CUNPK. Indian Navy has deployed 10‐member Marine Commando MTT to Maldives in 2017, 2018 and 2019 and likewise offered MNDF with helo‐borne vertical insertion functionality.  

India has enhanced its strategic engagement in the territories of the Maldives. A June 2019 joint assertion acknowledged:

In recognition that the safety pursuits of each nations are interlinked in the area, they reiterated their assurance of being conscious of one another’s issues and aspirations for the stability of the area and never permitting their respective territories for use for any exercise inimical to the different. (Ministry of External Affairs, 2019b).

The strategic engagements have concerned offering technical assist, lending and granting naval or maritime vessels and putting in coastal surveillance programs in Maldivian territories. In 2019, India reportedly gifted a ‘patrol vessel named “KAAMIYAB” to the Maldives’ as half of the Modi authorities’s efforts to embrace maritime regional safety via the India-Maldives partnership (The Economic Times, 2019).  Both leaders have ‘jointly inaugurated the Composite Training Facility of the Maldives National Defence Force in Maafilaafushi, and the Coastal Surveillance Rader System by remote link’ (Ministry of External Affairs, 2019b). In November 2020, the Maldives additionally resumed its participation in the India-Sri Lanka-Maldives National Security Advisor-level Talks. These safety talks had been stalled throughout the final 6 years as a result of of the worsening Maldives-India relations throughout former President Yameen’s time period. This revival of subregional safety talks has additional anticipated the Maldives’ endorsement of India’s strategic step-up as a regional safety supplier.

Shared Ideas and Maldives’s Role in Balancing Security Issues

India’s step-up in defence and strategic cooperation has introduced the Maldives nearer to its broader Indo-Pacific safety area in South Asia. India has a key position as the web safety supplier in its area notably with respect to China’s affect in South Asia’s maritime states like the Maldives. President Solih’s choice to overview the improvement cooperation and investments with China demonstrated an alignment of his political concepts with India’s view that China’s regional engagements have to be saved below test (Rehman, 2009). Although Solih’s authorities has not seen China as safety risk to the Maldives, his overseas coverage has nonetheless lessened China’s affect in the Maldives. This coverage has allowed the Maldives to play a vital position in the Indo-Pacific safety area by supporting India’s containment technique in opposition to China and enhancing India’s defence engagement in the maritime boundaries.

The Maldives-India defence and safety partnership can improve the Maldives’ strategic position in Indo-Pacific safety area. However, this position is dependent upon the home political concepts. President Solih’s authorities has adopted a pro-India overseas coverage. The former authorities’s pro-China method led to the deterioration of Maldives-India relations throughout the interval 2013 to 2018. This is a vital consideration that may affect strategic considering and political practices moulding current and future relations between the two states.

Constructivists argue that shared concepts can form mutual understanding between states. Which brings concepts at the forefront of constructing alliances. Despite the measurement and materials powers of states, concepts can form inter-state cooperation and competitors throughout disaster and alter (Flockhart, 2016; Rasheed, 2020). In this respect, India’s step-up in maritime defence and safety cooperation programmes was to a big extent form by the Maldives’ current need to shift regional coverage pursuits in direction of India. One can argue that this alliance is sustainable solely to the extent that the political concepts of each the states stay aligned and constant—i.e. the home political concepts in the Maldives ought to adhere to ‘India First’ coverage. This implies that Maldives-India step-up in defence cooperation is assured to the extent that the political functions and decisions of the Maldives known as for a regional agenda that actively helps India’s efforts in curbing China’s growth.

In this respect, a future change of authorities or native political considering in the Maldives can take a extra passive method to regional safety cooperation by focusing extra on improvement cooperation, because it did throughout President Yameen’s time period. Yameen didn’t lower diplomatic ties with India when his authorities enhanced improvement investments with China (Rasheed, 2020). His political concepts promoted the Maldives’ nationwide improvement goals, the elementary points of which haven’t modified even in the present politico-economic system. As a SIDS the Maldives has been— and continues to be—depending on overseas assist for its improvement course of. China’s BRI provided a finance and funding alternative for Yameen’s authorities to ship its political and financial coverage goals. Yameen’s unwillingness to hitch India’s marketing campaign to curb the Chinese growth in the area was due to this fact merely pushed by his pro-China improvement coverage concepts and never primarily based on a safety agenda.

The shift in coverage pursuits in direction of India since Solih’s authorities additionally illustrates the means altering political concepts have formed the new authorities’s overseas coverage in driving a renewed Maldives-India regional safety cooperation effort. However, the future path of the home political decisions will decide the position the Maldives will play as a strategic ally of India. This could also be argued contemplating the proven fact that Maldivians can all the time re-establish nearer ties with China if a future authorities is much less motivated to play a management position in regional safety. Such coverage shift can be prone to happen if a future authorities is extra politically safe and steady. If this have been to occur, the Maldives could doubtlessly create uncertainties for Indo-Pacific safety area.


India should play a key position inside Indo-Pacific safety area to make sure regional safety in South Asia and surrounding maritime boundaries. The Indo-Pacific safety area has been developed as a response to the progress of extra-regional powers (notably China’s) in India’s maritime sphere of affect. This method to regional safety is a elementary side driving the energy dynamics and geostrategic competitors between India and its regional maritime companions. The Maldives has been one of India’s closest regional maritime companions, and the bilateral relationship between the two is constructed of mutual belief and neighbourly bonds. However, the means in which the Maldives has shaped regional alliances with extra-territorial powers, reminiscent of China, have had a big impression on India’s capability to completely handle regional safety inside the Indio-Pacific safety area.

Since the launch of the BRI, the Maldives has strengthened its relationship with China to assist its improvement efforts. However, China’s financial engagement has additionally introduced it nearer to India’s sphere of affect and created geostrategic competitors between the two, difficult India’s capability to maintain conventional safety norms and customs adopted by its Indo-Pacific companions.

As this text has demonstrated, the Maldives can affect regional energy dynamics regarding India and China. This is defined in the context of political concepts and nature of insurance policies adopted for improvement cooperation between the Maldives, China and India. Solih’s authorities generated concepts to resume cooperation with India and overview China’s engagement with the Maldives. This created a chance for India to reinforce bilateral ties particularly maritime defence cooperation with the Maldives. This has additionally made the Maldives vital participant in the Indo-Pacific safety area so far as India is anxious. The Maldives can act as a big influencer in shifting geopolitical competitors between regional powers.     


Avas (2020). Radar programs, MNDF Composite Training Center inaugurated. Avas. Retrieved from

Baruah, Darshana M. (2020) India in the Into-Pacific New Delhi’s Theater of Opportunity. Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. Retrieved from

Das, Okay. C. (2017). The making of One Belt, One Road and dilemmas in South Asia. China Report, 53(2), 125–142.

Flockhart, T. (2008). Constructivism and Foreign Policy. In S. Smith, A. Hadfield, & T. Dunne (Eds.), Foreign Policy: Theories, Actors, Cases. UK: Oxford University Press.

Joshi, R. (2018). View: China testing India’s resolve in Maldives. The Economic Times, Retrieved from ence/view-china-testing-indias-resolve-inmaldives/articleshow/63135488.cms

Laskar, Rezaul H (2020). India makes China level, US hints at ‘formal’ Quad. Hindustan Times, Retrieved from

Maldives Independent (2015). President Yameen’s speech on 50 years of UN membership. Retrieved from ent-yameens-speech-on-50-years-of-unmembership-120410

Miadhu (2020). Male’-Vilimale bridge mashroou ah India in hiley ehee dhinumuge MoU eh gai soikohfi. Miadhu, Retrieved from

Miglani, Sanjeev and Junayd, Mohamed (2018). India’s Modi embraces Maldives as new chief takes workplace, China out of favour. Reuters, Retrieved from

Ministry of External Affairs (2018). Prime Minister’s Keynote Address at Shangri La Dialogue (June 01, 2018). Retrieved from

Ministry of External Affairs (2019a). India-Maldives bilateral relations. Retrieved from

Ministry of External Affairs (2019b). India-Maldives Joint Statement throughout the State Visit of Prime Minister to Maldives. Retrieved from

Ministry of External Affairs (2019c). Joint Statement on the Official Visit of Minister of External Affairs of India to Maldives. Retrieved from

Ministry of Foreign Affair of Japan (2018). International state of affairs and Japan’s diplomacy in 2018. Retrieved from

Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China (2014). The Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence. Retrieved from

President’s Office (2014a). Joint press communique between the Republic of Maldives and the People’s Republic of China, 15 September 2014, Male’.

President’s Office (2017a). Unofficial Translation of the Independence Day Remarks by His Excellency Abdulla Yameen Abdul Gayoom, President of the Republic of Maldives.

Rasheed, A. A. (2018). Ideas, Maldives-China relations and stability of energy dynamics in South Asia. Journal of South Asian Studies, 6(2).

Rasheed, A. A. (2019). Can the Maldives Steer Regional Power Politics? E-International Relations. Retrieved from

Rasheed, A. A. (2020). ‘Drivers of the Maldives’ Foreign Policy on India and China.’ In Navigating India-China Rivalry: Perspectives from South Asia. South Asian Discussion Papers. Retrieved from

Rasheed, A. A. (2020). Climate Ideas as Drivers of Pacific Islands’ Regional Politics and Cooperation. E-International Relations. Retrieved from

Rej, Abhijnan (2020) India Welcomes US-Maldives Defense Cooperation Agreement in a Sign of Times. Retrieved from

Rehman, Iskander (2009) Asian Security, Vol. 5, No. 2, April 2009: pp. 1–21 Asian Security Keeping the Dragon at Bay: India’s Counter-Containment of China in Asia India’s Counter-Containment of China in Asia Asian Security. Asian Security, 5(2), 114–143.

South China Morning Post (2018). Maldives seems to be to ‘long lost cousin’ China, regardless of ‘brother’ India’s concern. Retrieved from

State Council of PRC (2014). China’s overseas assist (2014). Retrieved from

The Economic Times (2018). PM Modi arrives in Maldives to attend President-elect Ibrahim Mohamed Solih’s inauguration.Retrieved from

The Economic Times (2019). India items patrol vessel to Maldives as web safety supplier of area. Retrieved from

Tiezzi, S. (2018). China to India: Respect Maldives’ Sovereignty. The Diplomat. Retrieved kind

Xinhuanet (2017) “Work Together to Build the Silk Road Economic Belt and the 21st Century Maritime Silk Road”: Speech by H.E. Xi Jinping President of the People’s Republic of China At the Opening Ceremony of The Belt and Road Forum for International Cooperation on 14 May 2017. Retrieved from

Zhang, Yanbing and Huang, Ying (2012) ‘Foreign Aid: The Ideological Differences between China and the West’, Contemporary International Relations 22(2).

Zhang, Yanbing, Gu, Jing and Chen, Yunnan (2015). Rising Powers in International Development: China’s Engagement in International Development Cooperation: The State of the Debate. Retrieved from

Wendt, A. (1992). Anarchy is what states make of it. International Organization 46, 394–419.

Further Reading on E-International Relations

Leave a Reply

All countries
Total confirmed cases
Updated on February 26, 2021 2:44 pm

Most Popular

Most Popular

Recent Comments

Chat on WhatsApp
How can we help you?