Tuesday, March 9, 2021
Home World Intelligence Sharing in Remote Warfare

Intelligence Sharing in Remote Warfare

This is an excerpt from Remote Warfare: Interdisciplinary Perspectives. Get your free obtain from E-International Relations.

In the post-9/11 interval, the logic of distant warfare for Western powers has been significantly affected by the difficult and transnational nature of terrorist and prison actions, and by a rising Western fatigue with fatalities amongst its personal troops. Increasing budgetary pressures on army expenditure and the drive to ‘achieve more with less’ are undoubtedly rising the lure. Coupled with these drivers, developments in expertise are encouraging Western nations to ascertain relationships and capabilities with companions that enable for intelligence assortment from afar. These developments can supply safety dividends if carried out successfully however may include a possible value to state and society. This chapter examines the function that intelligence sharing performs in the broader idea of distant warfare and evaluates the seemingly dangers to state and society. It considers the methods in which intelligence sharing underpins developments, in the form of the sharing of bulk knowledge at pace and the networking of weapons methods. In a way, intelligence is the glue that binds collectively companions and brokers in the entire growth of the distant warfare panorama.

There are undoubtedly sturdy drivers to develop and improve intelligence sharing relationships in the trendy surroundings of battle and danger (Aldrich 2004; Reveron 2006; Richards 2018), and these are evaluated right here. Not all of those drivers are essentially nefarious, and, if safeguards are noticed, intelligence sharing has the potential to make the world a safer place. If finished badly, nonetheless, the sharing of intelligence can run the chance of outsourcing legally and ethically doubtful actions to these states who don’t share the identical requirements of human rights and democratic accountability in their pursuit of nationwide safety (Krishnan 2011). In the case of a rustic such because the UK, the extra companions with whom intelligence is shared and the more serious their respective histories of human rights compliance, the better the challenges confronted in convincing others that safety is being delivered in a democratic, accountable and moral means. A case research is then examined of the UK in the post-9/11 surroundings, and the challenges it has confronted in its intelligence sharing actions.

A associated hazard issues the ‘bulk’ sharing of intercepted materials, as Edward Snowden revealed was occurring between the US and a number of allies, together with the UK, in his launch of categorized materials in 2013. Here, the chance is that extremely complicated and built-in indicators intelligence (Sigint) methods sharing ever extra industrial-scale quantities of information, might enable for unverified misuse of intelligence. There is a danger to privateness right here as a lot as a danger of abuse.

Added to those issues is the truth that a state’s oversight of its intelligence businesses and their actions could be inherently troublesome (Phythian 2007; Gill 2012; Dobson 2019). Within this panorama, intelligence sharing relationships are sometimes among the many most delicate points of any intelligence company’s operations. Such relationships are often shrouded in heavy secrecy, not solely from the general public however sometimes from a state’s personal oversight our bodies. States will argue nationwide safety causes for this needing to be so, however going forwards, the significance of due diligence and sturdy oversight of intelligence sharing relationships and operations will have to be extremely developed if critical dangers to state and society are to not be realised.

The case for intelligence sharing

In some ways, the fundamental logic of intelligence sharing is troublesome to dispute. Indeed, in response to the menace posed by violent extremists coming back from conflicts corresponding to these in Iraq and Syria (the ‘foreign fighters’ drawback), the UN Security Council (UNSC) handed Resolution 2396 in 2017, reminding member states of the necessity for ‘timely information sharing, through appropriate channels and arrangements’ to disrupt the planning of assaults (UNSC 2017, 3).

As the erstwhile Director-General of Britain’s MI5 intelligence company, Eliza Manningham-Buller, famous (ISC 2018a, 134), the 9/11 assaults marked a watershed following which ‘the need for enhanced international cooperation to combat the threat from al-Qaida and its affiliates’ was taken as a given. Such threats from worldwide terrorism have turn out to be extra dynamic, with new connections and contours of data being cast throughout the globe with rising ease and rapidity.

In the intelligence world, the ‘Five Eyes’ relationship which flowed from shared experiences in the Second World War, encompasses extremely built-in intelligence sharing between the US, UK, Canada, Australia and New Zealand. Intelligence sharing operates on a number of different ranges, nonetheless, a lot of that are far much less structured and avowed than the Five Eyes or NATO. In some circumstances, a set of states will take part in semi-structured, multilateral fora for sharing intelligence – a superb instance being the Club of Berne’s group of Western safety businesses (Walsh 2006), whose membership intently mirrors that of NATO.[1] At the tactical degree, specific businesses may even generally take part in multinational intelligence ‘hubs’ or ‘fusion centres’[2], often coping with particular points corresponding to regional counter-crime or counterterrorism. Beneath all of those extra formal relationships, a myriad of bilateral or multilateral intelligence relationships will function between states, with very centered aims and mechanisms.

In all circumstances, intelligence sharing is a very delicate and secretive enterprise. The lifeblood of any safety company is the set of covert sources and capabilities it is ready to deploy in ways in which garner strategic benefit over adversaries (Warner 2002). The loss or compromise of such capabilities can result in instantaneous operational failure, and infrequently political ignominy. Like reputations, delicate intelligence sources take a very long time to ascertain, however could be destroyed in a short time. Forging a relationship with a accomplice can usually be a few complicated net of mutual pursuits, whereby info is simply one of many requirements of foreign money.

Geography is often essential in prompting a relationship. In a way, it is a key catalyst for distant warfare, as nationwide safety threats migrate out to the badlands of Asia, Africa and the Middle East. Such issues present the rationale for capacity-building initiatives, by which investments could be made in the aptitude of native companions. In the Five Eyes context, the dispersed geography of the companions was helpful in establishing world interception methods corresponding to ECHELON (Perrone 2001). More just lately, proof means that various airbases in Europe present essential communications infrastructure for guiding the US’ distant concentrating on throughout the Middle East, North Africa and South Asia (Amnesty International 2018, 6).

Such relationships could also be uneven in the sense that the state reaching out to ascertain the partnership might obtain advantages in a unique space in return. These may not even be about intelligence capabilities per se, however might embody army assist or different financial investments. This additionally signifies that such relationships can work each methods and that threats could be made to ‘turn off the tap’ if there are political or diplomatic issues – as Pakistan, for instance, has continuously urged to the US (Bokhari et al 2018). In some ways, this mirrors the broader drawback of perverse incentives created by long-term army assist programmes, of which intelligence capacity-building is commonly a component (Bapat 2011; Boutton 2014).

There is a selected issue right here regarding terrorism. One of the important thing advantages is that counterterrorism (like counter-crime) tends to transcend all different political issues, even when definitions of who the ‘terrorist’ is can differ significantly in the face of native political aims. That apart, from a coverage perspective, the fundamental strategic idea of countering transnational terrorism could be the one matter on which just about each state agrees, even when they don’t in most different points. This applies to Western relationships with Russia and China, for instance, and to relationships with Middle Eastern states.

Difficulties and challenges

A key precept of intelligence sharing is the ‘third-party rule’, which signifies that any nation receiving intelligence from a accomplice agrees to not share it onwards with one other celebration – except they’ve specific permission to take action. This settlement depends on mutual belief and it isn’t at all times attainable to make certain the place a bit of intelligence has ended up. There is, in fact, additionally the fixed danger {that a} accomplice company could also be infiltrated or corrupted by a hostile energy.

Plenty of current inquiries into intelligence exercise have established that intelligence sharing relationships with worldwide companions are not often the topic of formal and documented memoranda of understanding (MoUs). Indeed, businesses corresponding to MI6 level out that such formal preparations are often prevented, not solely in order to maintain the small print to the minimal, but additionally as a result of a basic lack of belief could be implied if the UK at all times insists on every little thing being formally documented and bureaucratised (ISC 2018b, 62). For an company whose enterprise is establishing relationships with states exterior of the West with a unique tradition of bureaucratic norms, such components should be taken fastidiously into consideration. On the opposite hand, as a former Ambassador to Uzbekistan famous, not documenting joint intelligence actions can generally transform for causes of the concealment of abusive behaviours (ISC 2018a, 60).

‘Diplomatic assurances’ are the formal methodology whereby intelligence companions decide to safeguarding human rights, and these have been established with a number of accomplice nations in the post-9/11 interval. But human rights organisations corresponding to Human Rights Watch (HRW) are scathing in regards to the utility of such devices as a safeguard towards abuse (HRW 2005, 3). Amnesty International has echoed their sentiments, noting that ‘the best way to prevent torture is to refuse to send people to places where they risk being harmed’ (cited in Richards 2013, 183).[3]

It is the case that the majority non-Western states shouldn’t have clearly delineated and articulated expressions of their nationwide safety aims and technique (see for instance HMG n.d.). In many circumstances, nationwide safety is simply what a state should do to guard itself. Most shouldn’t have any laws governing the scope or modus operandi of their intelligence and safety businesses, and lots of have severely missing or compromised mechanisms for parliamentary scrutiny of their actions.

The founding father of the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt, Hassan Al-Banna, was proper in his prediction that entrenched states in the Middle East would at all times want to repress populist Islamist actions (Mitchell 1993, 30). Western nations usually share this goal, and this drives a lot up to date intelligence sharing. But the issue is that the underlying conception of nationwide safety could also be totally different between states, and generally dangerously so. The drawback can usually present itself in the accomplice nation wishing to acquire intelligence on expatriate dissident actions relatively than on ‘terrorists’ per se, as a quid professional quo for supplying intelligence on terrorist suspects. For the UK, the place London has been lambasted in the previous as a haven for radicals and dissidents (Foley 2013, 248), this may be a pretty ingredient for nations that want to get hold of intelligence on London-based political oppositionists. Rudner (2004, 214) describes how Egypt and Jordan have each complained to the UK about its failure to provide them with intelligence on dissidents residing in London, whereas Sepper (2010, 175) describes the case of the Libyan authorities with the ability to interrogate detainees at Guantanamo Bay about dissidents in the UK.

Conversely, intelligence offered to such nations on purported terrorist targets can result in violent actions being taken on the bottom, violating human rights, neutralising potential additional sources of intelligence, and producing political blowback. After 1981, the US allegedly slowed the movement of intelligence to Mossad after the Israelis had used their info to destroy Iraq’s nascent nuclear reactor in a pre-emptive army strike (Kahana 2001, 414). More just lately, heavy army actions towards Hamas and Hezbollah throughout the Occupied Territories proceed to put Western army and intelligence companions of Israel in uncomfortable positions regarding complicity with disproportionate army motion in civilian areas (Curtis 2018).

In many conditions, warfare and violent counter-insurgency operations might trigger particularly troublesome inquiries to be requested, not simply in phrases of using army gear being provided to repressive regimes, but additionally to the tactical use of intelligence. In the continued civil warfare in Yemen, for instance, the US has come below rising stress to curb army and intelligence help to Saudi Arabia following harmful bombings which have prompted appreciable civilian casualties (Gambino 2018), to not point out a humanitarian disaster affecting a lot of the inhabitants. Britain’s MI6 and Special Forces have additionally been implicated in supplying geolocational intelligence to the Americans to facilitate drone strikes by forces in the area (Norton-Taylor 2016). Such operations are framed by the states in query as tackling ‘upstream’ terrorist threats from the likes of al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP). But the query must be requested – to what value?

Case research: the UK’s submit 9/11 safety surroundings

Officially, the UK makes an excessive amount of its mission to uphold values in its overseas coverage. On the event of the 2017 International Day in Support of Victims of Torture, the Foreign and Commonwealth Office’s (FCO) Minister for Human Rights, Lord Ahmad, famous that ‘The UK government condemns torture in all circumstances’ (FCO 2017). Urging different states to ‘sign, ratify and implement’ the UN Convention Against Torture and its Optional Protocol can really feel disingenuous, nonetheless, when the UK itself turns into embroiled in detainee mistreatment scandals or arms gross sales to repressive regimes.

In Afghanistan in the post-9/11 interval, operational collaboration with the brand new intelligence company, the National Directorate of Security (NDS), has proved to be a sophisticated enterprise. In 2007, Amnesty International revealed a listing of human rights abuses in Afghanistan and ISAF’s alleged complicity in the abuse, a lot of it centred across the NDS’s infamous ‘Department 17’ facility in Kabul (Richards 2013, 177–8). In 2012, the British peace activist Maya Evans was profitable in securing a judicial assessment that positioned a short lived moratorium on detainee handovers in Afghanistan (Carey 2013).

One of the extra vital particular person circumstances in the post-9/11 interval was that of Binyam Mohamed, an Ethiopian nationwide who had previously been a resident in the UK. In April 2002, Mohamed alleges that he was arrested in Pakistan on terrorist fees and subsequently mistreated over a interval of three months (ISC 2018a, 123–4). He alleged he was then illegally rendered to Morocco and thereafter to Guantanamo Bay, the place he was subjected to additional mistreatment (ISC 2018a, 124). In 2010, the UK Government introduced that it had settled out of courtroom with Mohamed and fifteen different former Guantanamo detainees, twelve of whom had launched authorized motion towards the heads of MI5 and MI6, for undisclosed sums believed to quantity in the tens of thousands and thousands of kilos (BBC News 2010).

The case of a Libyan dissident against Muammar Gaddafi by the identify of Abdel Hakim Belhaj prompted comparable political controversy. Belhaj was illegally rendered from Thailand to Libya by the CIA in 2004, performing on British intelligence (Hutton 2018). Allegations of subsequent brutal torture by the Libyans culminated in a declare towards the British authorities for £1 in compensation and a full apology, ultimately settled in May 2018, when a press release was delivered to parliament on behalf of the Prime Minister, apologising ‘unreservedly’ and lamenting Belhaj’s ‘appalling treatment’ (Hutton 2018).

In each circumstances, the defining options have been a willingness by UK intelligence businesses to work with unsatisfactory regimes to pursue their counter-terrorism aims; and complicity in the mistreatment of detainees by a need to not disrupt the important thing intelligence relationship with the US

Meanwhile, one of many perpetrators of the 2013 homicide of Fusilier Lee Rigby, Michael Adebolajo, has alleged that he was overwhelmed and threatened with electrocution and rape on a couple of event throughout detention in Kenya by the hands of a police unit with a relationship with British intelligence (ISC 2014, 153). Leaving apart his subsequent conviction for homicide, the allegations highlighted various troublesome questions for the British intelligence equipment on whether or not and the way such allegations involving a accomplice nation are investigated, and whether or not the UK is successfully complicit in mistreatment if one in every of its intelligence companions commits the wrongdoing. One main space of danger highlighted by the case was the query of which intelligence has been probably derived from torture the place a number of businesses have been working collectively, and the place intelligence is pooled in such a means that the provenance of particular person items of data could also be troublesome to determine. The Chair of the Intelligence and Security Committee (ISC) has recognized this as a big space of ongoing danger.[4]

One of the extra noteworthy investigations undertaken by the ISC in current years has been that into the query of the mistreatment and rendition of detainees in the post-9/11 years (the Detainee Mistreatment and Rendition [DMR] Inquiry). This investigation struck on the coronary heart of intelligence relationships with the UK’s vary of companions in the counterterrorism realm, with a lot of whom critical questions regarding human rights abuses have been hanging in the air.

The issues in the early interval after 9/11 have been manifold. In all, the Inquiry discovered two circumstances the place British intelligence officers appeared to have been straight concerned in the mistreatment of detainees. There have been 13 different circumstances the place mistreatment was witnessed by British intelligence officers, and 128 circumstances the place overseas intelligence companions spoke in regards to the mistreatment of detainees. There have been 232 documented circumstances the place intelligence was shared with companions identified to commonly observe mistreatment; and 198 circumstances the place intelligence was obtained from such companions. Two cases have been discovered of British intelligence businesses providing to pay for the extraordinary rendition of suspects; and 22 circumstances the place British intelligence straight led to the unlawful rendition of suspects.

The particulars quantity to a complete realisation throughout this era of the chance that intelligence relationships can result in the intense compromise of human rights. Aside from some circumstances of obvious direct complicity in mistreatment, there was clear proof of an absence of coaching amongst intelligence officers about what does or doesn’t represent mistreatment (ISC 2018a, 131). There was additionally proof that components of the British intelligence equipment both had no mechanism for filtering out intelligence that will have been derived from torture, or have been usually completely satisfied to depend on broad assurances that requirements have been being upheld, when they need to have had sturdy grounds for suspecting in any other case (Ibid., 55). On the important thing intelligence relationship with the Americans, the DMR Inquiry discovered proof that British intelligence officers on the bottom have been both unwilling to lift questions on obvious mistreatment, or did so solely half-heartedly, for concern that they might harm the general intelligence relationship (Ibid., 58). This constituted a critical structural danger in the system.

From 2004 onwards, the DMR Inquiry discovered proof of the state of affairs beginning to change for the higher. In 2010, the Consolidated Guidance (CG) on the right way to correctly deal with detainees was issued to all intelligence officers on the bottom. Sir Mark Waller, the Intelligence Services Commissioner for the interval 2011–16, subsequently instructed the ISC that he was ‘broadly happy’ that the varied intelligence providers have been deciding on the correct circumstances to which the CG ought to apply and have been correctly flagging up the circumstances in which there could possibly be issues (Ibid., 22).

The CG shouldn’t be seen as a panacea, nonetheless. The ISC, and Sir Mark Waller, have flagged a selected concern that the CG doesn’t adequately tackle the broader context of intelligence relationships with joint models, however solely case-specific incidents and exchanges (ISC 2018b, 50). The query is partly one in every of sources and capabilities, since perpetual monitoring of day-to-day conduct in an abroad joint unit is troublesome, resource-intensive, and could possibly be perceived as indicative of a basic lack of belief in the accomplice.

In some respects, this pertains to the broader query of the utility and dangers of capacity-building programmes in the trendy period. As Watling and Shabibi (2018) famous in the context of Yemen, such programmes involving a number of companions could be complicated, politically fraught, cost-intensive and troublesome to deliver to a stage the place they’re including worth on the bottom relatively than exacerbating present issues and tensions. This is to not say that they’re at all times redundant, nonetheless: the correct programme, correctly managed, can ship essential dividends.

Risks to state and society

The dialogue up to now has highlighted the potential dilemma for contemporary states engaged in distant warfare to stability the imperatives of sharing intelligence with companions to ship nationwide safety, towards the chance of ‘dirty hands’ (Walzer 1973, 161) that arises in doing so. The principal danger is that elevated flows of intelligence between companions might imply safeguarding human rights not solely turns into tougher to make sure, however that even understanding the place rights have been compromised might be more and more troublesome to ascertain.

For liberal democratic states such because the UK, the primary and most evident danger is a reputational one, whereby supposed commitments to common human rights can begin to sound like empty guarantees when circumstances of complicity in abuse come up. This might, in flip, scale back the affect of the UK on the world stage at a time when it might in poor health afford to take action.

For broader society, there are basic questions on a retrenchment from the core values of peace, democracy and human rights. In the intelligence sharing context, there are additionally public fears about an inexorable creep in direction of a world ‘surveillance society’ (Beck 2002; Kerr and Earle 2013; Lyon 2014; Richards 2016). At a time when authoritarian regimes are more and more managing to put nationwide safety imperatives above commitments to trendy liberal values, states such because the UK needs to be aiming to be the vanguard of such liberal values, relatively than permitting themselves to fall into the identical boat of authoritarianism, secrecy and abuse.

The creation of ‘Big Data’ (which suggests each a massively elevated quantity of accessible knowledge on the actions of the citizenry; but additionally more and more subtle expertise for extracting worth from such knowledge) has delivered a posh set of alternatives and dangers for the main intelligence providers. On the partnerships entrance, bettering expertise has more and more allowed for industrial-scale pooling and cross-referring of main knowledge collections spanning world communications, by linking-together the Sigint methods of companions. A secret National Security Agency (NSA) system uncovered by Snowden known as RAMPART-A, for instance, seems to be a global community of interception capabilities towards trunk fibre-optic cables carrying the majority of the worldwide communications community (Gallagher 2014). The system is a part of a community of 33 third-party Sigint relationships (Gallagher 2014).

Again, reputational points in regards to the conduct of liberal democratic states versus these of authoritarian regimes corresponding to China – who make no secret of the necessity to undertake near-ubiquitous surveillance of their citizenry – are positioned on the desk by such revelations.

As the civil rights NGO Privacy International (2018, 10) famous, there are three potential issues with these bulk surveillance actions. First is the query of the fundamental, extra-territorial human proper to privateness. A associated query is that of guaranteeing the authorized safety towards surveillance of the communications of a state’s personal nationals, and that of notably delicate interest-groups corresponding to attorneys, docs and journalists. Germany is without doubt one of the few nations that has taken steps to attempt to tackle this specific concern legislatively following a parliamentary inquiry[5], though in the view of 1 commentator, subsequent adjustments serve solely to make oversight of the nationwide intelligence service, the BND (Bundesnachrichtendienst), much more complicated and fragmented (Wetzling 2017). In the UK, MI5 has just lately been castigated for having ‘lost control’ of its knowledge retention and dealing with in such a means that illegal invasions of privateness might have turn out to be a systemic concern (Bowcott 2009).

In a case dropped at the Investigatory Powers Tribunal by Privacy International towards GCHQ in 2013 about entry to an NSA system known as PRISM (Privacy International 2018, 24), the parliamentary ISC committee discovered no proof that GCHQ had been circumventing UK regulation by its entry to the NSA system (ISC 2013). But, as with the abovementioned case towards MI5’s knowledge dealing with, there could also be a bent amongst nationwide intelligence providers to hide from their oversight our bodies info that has not been explicitly requested. This could possibly be both as a result of one thing critical is amiss, or just because satisfactory procedures haven’t been adopted correctly. Such circumstances undermine belief in the integrity of the businesses and in the capabilities of the state’s oversight operate.

Amnesty International (2018) has outlined a set of issues about intelligence sharing preparations between a set of European nations and the CIA in the facilitation of deadly drone strikes by the supply of geolocational knowledge. Given the variety of non-combatant collateral casualties in such strikes, there’s an ongoing debate as as to if such actions are authorized below worldwide regulation. In the Netherlands, the revelation of the dimensions and complexity of information exchanges with the US on Somali piracy has triggered a complete inquiry by the state’s parliamentary oversight physique, the CTIVD (Commissie van Toezicht op de Inlichtingen). Indeed, authorized challenges regarding intelligence help to the US in facilitating deadly drone strikes have been launched in a number of of the US’s European intelligence accomplice nations (Amnesty International 2018, 7).

The basic query right here is maybe a deep-rooted and vital one in regards to the influence of recent expertise on society. As with the arrival of synthetic intelligence (AI) and automation, one can foresee each thrilling new alternatives and grave dangers, relying on one’s standpoint. For intelligence providers, galloping expertise in the areas of information assortment, mining and evaluation, supply super new alternatives for tackling complicated worldwide menace actors and delivering nationwide safety. But there are additionally manifold dangers in sliding in direction of authoritarianism and repression, and lots of of those are solely simply starting to take form.

Going forwards

The de-centred and borderless nature of latest threats corresponding to these posed by al-Qaeda or Islamic State, means there’s an more and more inescapable logic in sharing intelligence with as many cooperative companions throughout boundaries as attainable. Again, technological developments in database capacities, bulk knowledge transmission and algorithmic evaluation have inspired and enabled such transformations.

The UK found to its value after 9/11, nonetheless, that some intelligence relationships can, in the fallacious circumstances, result in complicity in critical human rights abuses. In many circumstances, these arose from the significance of the connection with the US and the perceived want to not harm that relationship. But alliances with different companions the world over who see nationwide safety in very alternative ways to us may result in issues. As the volumes of information shared and the automation by which such sharing occurs each scale up, the flexibility to trace again from a selected piece of data to the supply of a human rights abuse turns into ever tougher to attain. There are critical ethical inquiries to be requested about permitting such issues to float, particularly in supposedly liberal democratic states.

Placing all of this in perspective, the reply might be to not bolt the secure door utterly. The basic drivers for sharing intelligence throughout boundaries in the pursuit of organised crime and terrorism are inescapable and are certainly mandated by the UN to all accountable member states. As with so many areas of society, new applied sciences can ship super advantages in this space if they’re used responsibly.

The UK and accomplice states must study from the errors of the speedy post-9/11 interval and guarantee as a lot oversight and accountability of their intelligence sharing relationships as they’ll ship. It is recognised, in fact, that delicate applied sciences and relationships shouldn’t be trumpeted on the entrance pages of the newspapers, since that can simply assist the enemies of democratic society. At the identical time, liberal democratic societies want to make sure that in all areas of the transfer in direction of distant warfare, the significance of defending rights and guaranteeing accountability will stay paramount. Training and capacity-building of companions are usually not dangerous issues and may certainly be sure that a rules-based {and professional} method to safety and intelligence turns into extra widespread throughout states and society. Training and steerage for frontline officers working with companions additionally must be regularly reviewed and developed.

In the quickly growing space of data-sharing with companions, expertise wants to make sure due diligence and audit capabilities for particular person items of data as a lot as attainable. To be honest, there’s proof that fears of outsourcing of unlawful or unacceptable practices in this space haven’t been realised to any main extent, so far as could be decided. But the dangers are rising regularly as we transfer by the following main revolution in army affairs, and vigilance towards eroding human rights must preserve tempo.


Aldrich, Richard J., 2004. ‘Transatlantic Intelligence and Security Cooperation.’ International Affairs, 80(4) (July): 731–53.

Amnesty International. 2018. Deadly Assistance: The function of European states in US drone strikes. London: Amnesty International.

BBC News. 2010. ‘Compensation to Guantanamo detainees “was necessary”.’ 16 November. https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-11769509

Beck, Ulrich. 2002. ‘The Terrorist Threat: World Risk Society Revisited.’ Theory, Culture and Society, 19(4): 39–55.

Bokhari, Fahran, Katrina Manson and Kiran Stacey. 2018. ‘Pakistan halts intelligence sharing with US after aid suspension.’ Financial Times. 11 January. https://www.ft.com/content/59969778-f6b1-11e7-88f7-5465a6ce1a00

Bowcott, Owen. 2019. ‘MI5 accused of “extraordinary and persistent illegality.”’ The Guardian. 11 June. https://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2019/jun/11/mi5-in-court-accused-of-extraordinary-and-persistent-illegality

Carey, Daniel. 2013. ‘Maya Evans case: secret courts, torture and avoiding embarrassment.’ The Guardian. 11 January. https://www.theguardian.com/law/2013/jan/11/maya-evans-secret-courts-torture

Curtis, Mark. 2018. ‘The raw truth about the UK’s particular relationship with Israel.’ Middle East Eye. 5 June. http://www.middleeasteye.net/columns/raw-truth-about-uk-israel-special-relations-456740882

Dobson, Melina J. 2019. ‘The last forum of accountability? State secrecy, intelligence and freedom of information in the United Kingdom.’ The British Journal of Politics and International Relations, 21(2: 3): 12–29.

FCO (Foreign and Commonwealth Office). 2017. ‘UK government reaffirms its commitment to combat torture.’ 26 June. https://www.gov.uk/government/news/uk-government-reaffirms-its-commitment-to-combat-torture

Foley, Frank. 2013. Countering Terrorism in Britain and France: Institutions, Norms and the Shadow of the Past. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press

Gallagher, Ryan. 2014. ‘How secret partners expand NSA’s surveillance dragnet.’ The Intercept. 19 June. https://theintercept.com/2014/06/18/nsa-surveillance-secret-cable-partners-revealed-rampart-a/

Gambino, Lauren. 2018. ‘Yemen war: senators push to end US support of Saudi Arabia.’ The Guardian. 28 February. https://www.theguardian.com/world/2018/feb/28/yemen-saudi-arabia-war-us-support-senator-push-to-end

Gill, Peter. 2012. ‘Intelligence, Threat, Risk, and the Challenge of Oversight.’ Intelligence and National Security, 27(2): 206–22.

Hillebrand, Claudia. 2017. ‘With or without you? The UK and information and intelligence sharing in the EU.’ Journal of Intelligence History, 16(2): 91–94.

HMG. N.d. ‘Fact Sheet 1: Our Approach to the National Security Strategy.’ https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/62483/Factsheet1-Our-Approach-National-Security-Strategy.pdf

HRW (Human Rights Watch). 2005. ‘Still at risk: Diplomatic Assurances no Safeguard against Torture.’ 17/4(D). April.

Hutton, Will. 2018. ‘In the Belhaj case, Britain set aside the rule of law and moral principles.’ The Guardian. 13 May. https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2018/may/13/in-case-of-belhaj-britain-set-aside-rule-of-law-and-moral-principles

Inkster, Nigel. 2016. ‘Brexit, Intelligence and Terrorism.’ Survival, 58(3): 23–30.

ISC (Intelligence and Security Committee). 2013. Press assertion. https://b1cba9b3-a-5e6631fd-s-sites.googlegroups.com/a/independent.gov.uk/isc/files/20130717_ISC_statement_GCHQ.pdf

———. 2014. Report on the intelligence regarding the homicide of Fusilier Lee Rigby. London: TSO, HC 795.

———. 2018a. Detainee Mistreatment and Rendition Inquiry 2001-10. London: TSO, HC113.

———. 2018b. Detainee Mistreatment and Rendition: Current Issues. London: TSO, HC 1114.

Kahana, Ephraim. 2001. ‘Mossad-CIA Cooperation.’ International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence, 14(3): 409–20.

Kerr, Ian, and Jessica Earle. 2013 ‘Prediction, Preemption, Presumption: How Big Data Threatens Big Picture Privacy.’ Stanford Law Review Online, 66/65.

Krishnan, Armin. 2011. ‘The Future of US Intelligence Outsourcing.’ Brown Journal of World Affairs, 18(1): 195–211.

Lyon, David. 2014. ‘Surveillance, Snowden, and Big Data: Capacities, consequences, critique.’ Big Data and Society, July–December.

Mitchell, Richard P., 1993. The Society of Muslim Brothers. New York: Oxford University Press.

Norton-Taylor, Richard. 2016. ‘UK special forces and MI6 involved in Yemen bombing, report reveals.’ The Guardian. 11 April.

Perrone, Jane. 2001. ‘The Echelon spy network.’ The Guardian. 29 May. https://www.theguardian.com/world/2001/may/29/qanda.janeperrone

Phythian, Mark. 2007. ‘The British experience with intelligence accountability.’ Intelligence and National Security, 22(1): 75–99.

Privacy International. 2018. Secret Global Surveillance Networks: Intelligence Sharing between Governments and the Need for Safeguards. London: Privacy International. April.

Reveron, Derek S. 2006. ‘Old Allies, New Friends: Intelligence sharing in the War on Terror.’ Orbis (Summer 2006): 453–68.

Richards, Julian. 2013. ‘Intelligence, Count-Insurgency and Reconstruction: Intelligence and International Cooperation in Afghanistan.’ Inteligencia y seguridad, 13: 167–92.

Richards, Julian. 2016. ‘Needles in Haystacks: Law, Capability, Ethics and Proportionality.’ In Big-Data Intelligence-Gathering,’ edited by Anno Bunnik, Anthony Cawley, Michael Mulqueen, and Andrej Zwitter. Basingstoke, Palgrave Macmillan.

Richards, Julian. 2018. Defining Remote Warfare: Intelligence sharing after 9/11. Remote Warfare Programme, Oxford Research Group.

Rudner, Martin. 2004. ‘Hunters and Gatherers: The Intelligence Coalition Against Islamic Terrorism.’ International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence, 17(2) 193–230.

Sepper, Elizabeth. 2010. ‘Democracy, Human Rights, and Intelligence Sharing.’ Texas International Law Journal, 46: 151–207.

UNSC (Security Council). 2017. ‘Resolution 2396.’ 21 December. https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/1327675/files/S_RES_2396%282017%29-EN.pdf

Walsh, James. I. 2006. ‘Intelligence sharing in the European Union: Institutions are not Enough.’ Journal of Common Market Studies, 44(3): 625–43.

Walzer, Michael. 1973. ‘Political Action: The Problem of Dirty Hands.’ Philosophy and Public Affairs, 2 (2) Winter: 160–80.

Warner. Michael. 2002. ‘Wanted: A Definition of “Intelligence”. Washington DC: Center for the Study of Intelligence. January: 15–22.

Watling, Jack. and Namir Shabibi. 2018. ‘British Training and Assistance Programmes in Yemen 2004 ­–2015.’ Remote Warfare Programme, Oxford Research Group. June.

Wetzling, Thorsten. 2017. ‘Germany’s intelligence reform: More surveillance, modest restraints and inefficient controls.’ Stiftung Neue Verantwortung, Policy Brief. June.


[1] At the time of writing, the influence of Brexit on intelligence sharing relationships is unknown and topic to a lot conjecture (Inkster 2016; Hillebrand 2017).

[2] Examples embrace Interpol, Europol, CARICOM’s Regional Intelligence Fusion Centre (RIFC) in the Caribbean area, or the Central Asia Regional Information and Coordination Centre (CARICC), to call however a couple of.

[3] Amnesty International, ‘Europe must halt unreliable ‘diplomatic assurances’ that danger torture. http://www.amnesty.org/en/news-and-updates/report/europe-must-halt-unreliable-diplomatic-assurances-risk-torture-2010-04-12

[4] Interview with creator, 16 July 2018.

[5] Die Gesetzes zur Ausland-Ausland Fernmeldeaufklärung des Bundenachtrichtendienstes; Laws on Foreign-to-Foreign Intelliegnce Gathering of the Federal Intelligence Service.

Further Reading on E-International Relations

Leave a Reply

All countries
Total confirmed cases
Updated on March 9, 2021 8:56 am

Most Popular

Most Popular

Recent Comments

Chat on WhatsApp
How can we help you?